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Abstract
We use the limited participation model of money as a laboratory for
studying the operating characteristics of Taylor rules for setting the rate
of interest. Rules are evaluated according to their ability to protect the
economy from bad outcomes such as the burst of in°ation observed in the
1970s. Based on our analysis, we argue for a rule which: (i) raises the
nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with a rise in in°ation; and (ii)
does not change the interest rate in response to a change in output relative
to trend.
JEL numbers: E1, E4, E52, E58
¤Portions of this document are reprinted, with the permission of the University of Chicago
Press, from a comment by us that is forthcoming in Taylor (1999a). The ¯rst author is grateful
to the National Science Foundation for a grant to the National Bureau of Economic Research.1. Introduction and Overview
Much research in monetary economics is stimulated by the burst of in°ation ex-
perienced by a number of countries in the 1970s. This research addresses two
questions: `why did this costly failure of monetary policy occur?', and `what can
be done to prevent it from happening again?'
This introduction begins by brie°y reviewing the evolution of thinking on these
questions, from the focus on institutional reform in the 1980s, to the focus on the
design of monetary policy rules more recently. We go on to discuss Taylor rules
speci¯cally, and why it is of interest to consider their operating characteristics in
a limited participation model of money. We then summarize the results obtained
when we do this. An implication of one of our results is that further progress on
the analysis of monetary policy rules would bene¯t from addressing some of the
issues of credibility considered in the earlier literature on institutional reform.
1.1. Identifying Good Institutions
The initial body of research addressing the two questions in the opening paragraph
was stimulated by the seminal papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983). This work suggested that there was an in°ation bias inherent
in monetary institutions and that some sort of institutional reform was required
to prevent a recurrence of 1970s-style in°ation. Examples of such institutional re-
form include legislative changes that focus a central bank's mission more sharply
on in°ation and that grant central banks more independence from the rest of the
government. Barro and Gordon's analysis led to the prediction that, absent such
reform, in°ation would move up and down as the incentives to in°ate moved up
and down. To operationalize the theory, they made the assumption that the cen-
tral bank's incentive to in°ate is measured by the natural rate of unemployment.
However, the Barro and Gordon theory lost some of its appeal in the two decades
since they wrote their paper, when the incoming evidence appeared to contradict
it.1 In the United States, a major, persistent drop in the rate of in°ation occurred
starting in 1980, about three years before the unemployment rate started to come
down. In Europe and other countries, the incentive to in°ate stood at a post-war
high in the 1980s and 1990s because the unemployment rate was so high, and yet
1Evidence that does support the Kydland and Prescott (1977) - Barro and Gordon (1983) idea
concerns the relationship between in°ation and central bank independence. See, for example,
the survey in Blanchard (1997, p. 55).
2in°ation was very low.2 Both sets of observations are puzzling from the Barro and
Gordon perspective, particularly because they were not preceded by signi¯cant,
formal institutional reform.3
1.2. Identifying Good Policy Rules
Alternative approaches to the two questions driving this literature were developed.
These place less emphasis on issues of commitment and on the notion that there is
an in°ation bias in modern monetary institutions. To explain this, the concept of
a monetary policy `rule' is useful. This speci¯es how the monetary authority varies
the instruments at its command as a function of the state of the economy. The
recent research focuses on identifying simple monetary policy rules that will reduce
the likelihood of a recurrence of a 1970s style in°ation outbreak. The underlying
vision is that the poor economic outcomes of the 1970s were a consequence of the
poor monetary policy rule in place at that time. The notion that improvements
in our understanding of the economy that have occurred since then, arising both
from conceptual advances and from increased data, put us in a position to design
a better rule now.4
2See Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999) and Friedman and Kuttner (1996) for an elaboration
on these observations.
3Various modi¯cations of the Barro and Gordon approach can potentially reconcile the ob-
servations on in°ation and unemployment with the theory. For example, one can posit that
there is variation over time in policymaker preferences (see Ball (1995), Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986), or Rogo® (1985)). Alternatively, by adopting a version of their theory in which the equi-
librium variables are a function of the history of past government actions, it is possible to have
equilibria in which central banks are `pushed' into supplying more or less in°ation in response
to movements in variables other than the natural rate of unemployment (see Chari, Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1998).) This can potentially account for the puzzling observations just cited.
We consider this below.
4For a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the outlook for this approach, see Sargent (1999).
He constructs a variant of the Kydland-Prescott/Barro-Gordon model in which the policymaker
modi¯es its views about the structure of the economy as new data come in. As these views evolve,
the policymaker adjusts its monetary policy rule. In Sargent's example, this process does not
converge. It simply leads to an endless repetition of in°ation take-o®'s like that observed in
the 1970s, followed by in°ation collapses. Sargent's example is important because it articulates
clearly a potential pitfall associated with the design of monetary policy rules. Still, the details
of his model are rejected in the sense that it is not able to account for duration of the high
in°ation in the 1970s. The reason is that the policy maker in Sargent's model, when confronted
with the simultaneous rise in in°ation and unemployment observed in the early 1970s, would
have inferred that high in°ation is not a productive way to reduce unemployment. According to
3In the quest for good monetary policy rules, rules for setting the interest rate
have taken a particularly prominent role. Such rules are called `Taylor rules' after
John Taylor, who has played an important role in popularizing this research.
The work has attracted so much attention in part because the interest rate is
what central bankers view themselves as controlling. As a result, the research
on interest rate rules has substantial potential practical relevance. Although this
research is still fairly new, a consensus has already begun to emerge. To explain
this, consider the following typical Taylor rule
rt = c + ½rt¡1 + ®¼t + ¯yt; (1.1)
where ¼t is the annualized rate of in°ation, rt is the annualized Federal Funds
rate and yt is the log deviation of output from trend. The emerging consensus
is that a Taylor rule characterized by an aggressive response of the interest rate
to high in°ation and high output is likely to yield good results.5 For example,
Taylor (1999) urges the implementation of a rule with ½ = 0, ¯ = 1 and ® = 1:5:
1.3. The Limited Participation Model as a Laboratory
The strategy of the existing literature evaluates monetary policy rules by studying
their operating characteristics in quantitative, economic models. For the most
part, the models used in this literature are sticky price, rational expectations
versions of the IS-LM model.6 The question naturally arises: are the existing
results robust to alternative, plausible models? We investigate this in the context
of one such model. In particular, we investigate the performance of Taylor rules in
a simple limited participation model recently studied by Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1998) (CCE).7 The mechanisms in this model di®er from those in
the existing literature. In particular, the friction which generates monetary non-
neutrality is a credit market friction, not stickiness in price setting. In addition,
the channel from expected in°ation to output in this model di®ers from what it
Sargent's model, the policymaker's reaction to this discovery would have been to keep in°ation
low. See Sargent's chapter 9 for a further discussion.
5See the papers in Taylor (1999a). See also Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) and King and
Kerr (1996).
6When researchers adopt models not in this paradigm, they often get di®erent results. See,
for example, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1998).
7For a comparison of the empirical performance of sticky price versus limited participation
models, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997).
4is in the sticky price, rational expectations version of the IS-LM model. Since the
source of monetary frictions and the channels from expected in°ation to output
are not yet well understood, we view our analysis as providing a useful robustness
check on the existing literature.
In evaluating a particular parameterization of the Taylor rule, we focus pri-
marily on its ability to rule out bad outcomes.8 In particular, we want to ensure
that the monetary policy rule is not itself a source of welfare-reducing instability
for the economy.9 This can happen for at least two reasons: (i) the rule may en-
able expectations of in°ation to become self ful¯lling, a situation that can occur
when the steady state equilibrium of the nonstochastic version of the economy is
`indeterminate' and (ii) the rule may cause the economy to react explosively to
shocks.
1.4. Our Results
Three results are reported below that we wish to emphasize here. First, ag-
gressiveness in a Taylor rule is a good idea, but only in response to in°ation.
Aggressiveness in the response to deviations in output from trend is a bad idea in
our model, and can produce welfare-reducing volatility of the kind cited in (i) and
(ii) in the previous paragraph. For example, we ¯nd that Taylor's recommended
values for ®;½;¯ places too much weight on output, and result in explosiveness.10
Second, when we incorporate the monetary policy rule estimated by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1997) to have been followed by the US Federal Reserve in the 1970s
into our model, we ¯nd that the model exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy. As a
result, our model is able to articulate the view that the burst of high in°ation in
8We do not seek to identify policy rule parameter values that optimize utility in our model,
and we make no attempt to compare the performance of Taylor rules with the unconstrained
optimal monetary policy. In our experience, ¯rst-order welfare gains are to be had by avoiding
the `bad outcomes' listed next in the text. Once these outcomes have been avoided, there is
relatively less to be gained from moving to the globally optimal speci¯cation. This is consistent
with ¯ndings reported in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), who display a model in which the
welfare function is relatively insensitive to alternative speci¯cations of interest rate rules, as long
as only parameter values in the region of equilibrium determinacy are considered.
9Other research that adopts this perspective on the design of monetary policy rules includes
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998, 1999) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1998).
10For another model with this property, see Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999).
5the 1970s was due to higher expectations of in°ation.11 According to the model,
these expectations were translated into higher actual in°ation because the policy
rule implemented in the 1970s was insu±ciently aggressive with respect to in°a-
tion. In this respect, our result is similar to the one reported for the sticky price,
rational expectations version of the IS-LM model considered by Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1997). Still, our result does di®er from theirs in one potentially impor-
tant respect. In our model, a rise in in°ation expectations that is self-ful¯lling
acts to weaken the economy. In a model like that of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1997), such a rise in in°ation expectations drives output up. This distinction
between these two classes of models may provide a way to discriminate between
them, since the 1970s are thought to be a period when output was low relative to
trend.
The basic intuition underlying these di®erent implications of our model and
versions of the standard IS-LM model is simple. The latter emphasize that higher
anticipated in°ation leads to a reduction in the real rate of interest, which in
turn results in a rise in output and actual in°ation by stimulating the investment
component of aggregate demand.12 If the central bank adopts a tight money policy
every time output and/or in°ation is high, this chain of causation from expected
in°ation to actual in°ation is cut. Thus, a high ® and/or a high ¯ eliminates
equilibria in these models in which high in°ation is self-ful¯lling.
Now consider our model. Here, higher anticipated in°ation induces households
to substitute out of cash deposits in the ¯nancial sector and towards the purchase
of goods. The resulting shortfall of cash in the ¯nancial sector puts upward
pressure on the nominal rate of interest. If ® in the central bank's policy rule is
small, it has to inject liquidity into ¯nancial markets in order to prevent a large
rise in the rate of interest. This expansion of liquidity would produce the increase
in in°ation that people anticipated. This is the intuition underlying our ¯nding
that a small value of ® increases the likelihood that expectations of in°ation can
11This is a view that is also articulated in Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998) and
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997).
12The basic logic can be illustrated using a textbook Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand
diagram, with price on the vertical axis and output on the horizontal. In the usual way, a fall
in expected in°ation shifts Aggregate Demand to the right. Prices rise as the economy moves
up along the Aggregate Supply curve. The resulting rise in price corresponds an actual rise in
in°ation. This chain linking expected in°ation to actual in°ation is broken if the authorities
shift the Aggregate Demand Curve to the left whenever they see output or in°ation rising. High
values of ® and ¯ do just that.
6be self-ful¯lling. Similarly, a large value of ® reduces the likelihood that this type
of equilibrium could exist.
The previous intuition also shows why a large value of ¯ can actually increase
the likelihood that in°ation expectations are self-ful¯lling in our model. That
is because the rise in the interest rate that occurs with a rise in in°ation under
the Fed's policy rule also produces a reduction in output. With a large ¯; that
fall in output operates to o®set the Fed's policy of raising the interest rate when
® > 0: In e®ect, raising ¯ cancels out the indeterminacy-¯ghting properties of a
high value of ®:
Our third and ¯nal result that deserves emphasis is the following. Our analysis
suggests that the literature on monetary policy rules may have been too quick to
abandon the issues of commitment raised by the analysis of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Our results suggest that a Taylor rule that
is su±ciently aggressive to inoculate the economy against a 1970s style in°ation
outburst may lack credibility because there is a strong - perhaps irresistible -
incentive to deviate from it. We computed an example in which a benevolent
central bank has an incentive to deviate from such a rule when there is a supply
shock which drives prices up and output down simultaneously. In the example,
the increased welfare gains from deviating to a k% rule at that time are the
equivalent of about 0:3% of consumption, forever. To get a sense of the magnitude
of this, it corresponds roughly to the amount the federal government spends on
the administration of justice, or on general science, space, and technology.13 This
is a substantial amount, and may be di±cult to resist for a central bank. A more
complete analysis of the concerns raised in this example requires spelling out more
clearly the details of the environment. This is beyond the scope of our analysis.14
13The preliminary estimate for 1997 of consumption of nondurable goods and services in the
1998 Economic Report of the President is $4.8 trillion, so that 0.3% of this is $16 billion. The
federal expenditures in ¯scal year 1997 on general science, space, and technology was $17 billion,
an on the administration of justice it was $20 billion.
14Rotemberg and Woodford have pointed out to us in private conversation that a sticky price
model may not su®er from the sort of credibility problem emphasized here. In a sticky price
model, there is a tendency for output to fall by less than the e±cient amount, after a bad
technology shock. According to this model, implementing a tight monetary policy at such a
time might actually improve the welfare of private agents.
71.5. Rules and Credibility
These results on credibility highlight a di®erent possible answer to the two ques-
tions posed in the ¯rst paragraph. It may be that the problem in the 1970s was
not lack of knowledge that a higher value of ® might have prevented the in°a-
tion take o®. Instead, reasoning as in Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998),
that episode may have re°ected a weakness in monetary policy institutions, which
simply could not resist accommodating higher in°ation expectations in a faltering
economy.
That these concerns may be of more than academic interest is suggested by
the statements on in°ation by Arthur Burns, who was chairman of the Federal
Reserve in the 1970s. These suggest that his failure to raise interest rates in line
with the dictates of a more aggressive Taylor rule did not re°ect ignorance about
the connection between money and in°ation. He claimed that, instead, it was
his fear of the social consequences of such an action that prevented him from
implementing a high interest rate policy.15 Thus, both history and theory suggest
that credibility issues should also be considered when designing monetary policy
rules.
The next section brie°y describes our model. Results are presented in the
following section. We close with a brief conclusion.
2. Model
In this section, we describe the model used in our analysis and we present some
empirical evidence in its favor.
15An excerpt from a speech by Arthur Burns in 1977 summarizes views that he repeated often
during his tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve: `We well know{as do many others{that
if the Federal Reserve stopped creating new money, or if this activity were slowed drastically,
in°ation would soon either come to an end or be substantially checked. Unfortunately, know-
ing that truth is not as helpful as one might suppose. The catch is that nowadays there are
tremendous nonmonetary pressures in our economy that are tending to drive costs and prices
higher....If the Federal Reserve then sought to create a monetary environment that seriously
fell short of accommodating the nonmonetary pressures that have become characteristic of our
times, severe stresses could be quickly produced in our economy. The in°ation rate would prob-
ably fall in the process but so, too, would production, jobs, and pro¯ts. The tactics and strategy
of the Federal Reserve System{as of any central bank{must be attuned to these realities.' For
additional discussion of Burns' (1978) speeches, see Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998).
8We examine the operating characteristics in our model of the following three
variants on (1.1):
rt = c + ½rt¡1 + ®Et¼t+1 + ¯yt; (Clarida-Gali-Gertler)
rt = c + ½rt¡1 + ®¼t + ¯yt; (Generalized Taylor)
rt = c + ½rt¡1 + ®~ ¼t¡1 + ¯yt¡1; (Lagged Taylor)
As before, rt is the (annualized) nominal rate of interest that extends from the
beginning of quarter t to the end of quarter t: Also, ¼t = log(Pt) ¡ log(Pt¡1);
~ ¼t = log(Pt) ¡ log(Pt¡4); and yt = log(Yt); after a trend has been removed. We
refer to the above as the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997) (CGG), the Generalized
Taylor (GT) and Lagged Taylor (LT) policy rules, respectively.
We study the performance of these three rules in the CEE model. A detailed
discussion of the model appears in CEE, and so we describe it only very brie°y
here. Apart from two modi¯cations, it is basically a standard limited participation
model. One modi¯cation is that, in addition to having a technology shock, it also
has a money demand shock. Traditionally, an important rationale for adopting an
interest rate targeting rule was to eliminate the e®ects of money demand shocks
from the real economy (see, for example, Poole (1970).) So, if anything, including
them in the analysis should bias the results in favor of the interest rate targeting
rule. A second di®erence is that, although there is still a monetary authority on
the sidelines transferring cash into and out of the ¯nancial system in our model
economy, those transfers are endogenous when the monetary authority conducts
its operations with the objective of supporting an interest rate targeting rule.
The representative household begins period t with the economy's stock of
money, Mt; and then proceeds to divide it between Qt dollars allocated to the
purchase of goods, and Mt ¡Qt dollars allocated to the ¯nancial intermediary. It
faces the following cash constraint in the goods market:
Qt + WtLt ¸ Pt(Ct + It);
where It denotes investment, Ct denotes consumption, Lt denotes hours worked,
and Wt and Pt denote the wage rate and price level. The household owns the
stock of capital, and it has the standard capital accumulation technology:
Kt+1 = It + (1 ¡ 0:02)Kt:
9The household's assets accumulate according to the following expression:
Mt+1 = Qt + WtLt ¡ Pt(Ct + It) + Rt(Mt ¡ Qt + Xt) + Dt + rktKt;
where Xt is a date t monetary injection by the central bank and Rt denotes the
gross quarterly rate of return on household deposits with the ¯nancial intermediary.16
Also, Dt denotes household pro¯ts, treated as lump sum transfers, and rkt is the
rental rate on capital. An implication of this setup is that the household's date
t earnings of rent on capital cannot be spent until the following period, while
its date t wage earnings can be spent in the same period. As a result, in°ation
acts like a tax on investment. The household's date t decision about Qt must be
made before the date t realization of the shocks, while all other decisions are made
afterward. This assumption is what guarantees that when a surprise monetary
injection occurs, the equilibrium rate of interest falls, and output and employ-
ment rise. To assure that these e®ects are persistent, we introduce an adjustment





; where Ht is in units of time, and H is an
increasing function.17 The household's problem at time 0 is to choose contingency
















subject to the information, cash, asset accumulation and other constraints. Here,
Ã = 1=2:5 and Ã0 is selected so that Lt = 1 in nonstochastic steady state.
Firms must ¯nance Jt of the wage bill by borrowing cash in advance from the
¯nancial intermediary, and 1 ¡ Jt can be ¯nanced out of current receipts. The
random variable, Jt; is our money demand shock, and it is assumed to have the
following distribution:
log(Jt) = 0:95log(Jt¡1) + "J;t;
16We have rt = 4(Rt ¡ 1):





















































































































































































































































16in°ation expectations to be self-ful¯lling. An important objective of monetary
analysis is to design rules which will not allow bad outcomes like this to happen
again. This paper studied the operating characteristics of Taylor rules in the
context of a limited participation model of money. In this model, monetary non-
neutrality arises from a particular friction in the household's portfolio decision.
Equilibria in which expectations about in°ation are self-ful¯lling are eliminated
when the Taylor rule responds aggressively to in°ation and very little to output.
A strong response to output risks destabilizing the economy. In this respect,
the model's implications di®er from those of standard sticky price models, which
suggest that the possibility of self-ful¯lling in°ation expectations are ruled out
when the Taylor rule responds aggressively both to in°ation and output.
So, which model should be taken more seriously for purposes of designing
monetary policy? We have pointed out that under a sticky price model, equilibria
in which in°ation expectations are self-ful¯lling tend, other things the same, to
be associated with high output and investment. The limited participation model
has the opposite property. This suggests that the latter may have an easier time
explaining the 1970s than the former, since this was a period when output and
investment were generally low. If a more formal analysis turns out to support this
possibility, then the policy implications of the limited participation model would
need to be taken seriously.
But, suppose it is not so easy to determine which model, the sticky price
model or the limited participation model, is closer to the truth? Robustness
considerations suggest picking a rule which works well in either model. And, each
model has the implication that bad outcomes are avoided by Taylor rules which
respond aggressively to in°ation and not to output. So, we conclude that if a
Taylor rule is to be adopted, then it should be of this type.
References
[1] Ball, Laurence, 1995, `Time-Consistent Policy and Persistent Changes in
In°ation,' Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 36, no. 2, November, pages
329-50.
[2] Barro, Robert J., and David B. Gordon, 1983, `A Positive Theory of Mone-
tary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,' Journal of Political Economy 91 (Au-
gust): 589-610.
17[3] Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martin Uribe, 1998, `Monetary
Policy and Multiple Equilibria,' unpublished manuscript.
[4] Blanchard, Olivier, 1997, Macroeconomics, Prentice-Hall.
[5] Blanchard, Olivier, and Charles Kahn, 1980, `The Solution of Linear Di®er-
ence Models under Rational Expectations,' Econometrica, 48(5), pp. 1305-11.
[6] Burns, Arthur, 1978, `Re°ections of an Economic Policy Maker, Speeches
and Congressional Statements: 1969-1978,' American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C.
[7] Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst, 1998, `Real Indeterminacy
under In°ation Rate Targeting,' manuscript.
[8] Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst, 1999, `Timing and Real In-
determinacy in Monetary Models,' unpublished manuscript.
[9] Chari, V.V., Lawrence J. Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum, 1998, `Expec-
tation Traps and Discretion', Journal of Economic Theory.
[10] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1997,
`Sticky Price and Limited Participation Models: A Comparison,' European
Economic Review, Vol. 41, no. 6, pages 1201-1249.
[11] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 1998,
`Modeling Money,' National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
6371.
[12] Christiano, Lawrence J., and Terry Fitzgerald, 1999, `Band Pass Filters,'
unpublished manuscript.
[13] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler, 1997, `Monetary Policy Rules
and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,' manuscript, New
York University.
[14] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler, 1997a, `The Science of Mon-
etary Policy,' manuscript, New York University.
18[15] Cukierman, Alex, and Allan Meltzer, 1986, `A Theory of Ambiguity, Credi-
bility, and In°ation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information,' Econo-
metrica, vol. 54, no. 5, September, pages 1099-1128.
[16] Friedman, Benjamin M., and Kenneth N. Kuttner, 1996, `A Price Target for
U.S. Monetary Policy? Lessons from the Experience with Money Growth
Targets,' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 77-146.
[17] Isard, Peter, Douglas Laxton, and Ann-Charlotte Eliasson, 1999, `Simple
Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty,' manuscript prepared for
the January 15-16, 1999 conference at the International Monetary Fund in
celebration of the contributions of Robert Flood.
[18] Kerr, William and Robert King, 1996, `Limits on Interest Rate Rules in
the IS-LM Model' Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly,
Spring.
[19] Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott, 1977, `Rules Rather Than Dis-
cretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,' Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 85, no. 3, June, pages 473-91.
[20] Poole, William, 1970, `Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a
Simple Stochastic Macro Model,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, pp.
197-216.
[21] Rogo®, Kenneth, 1985, `The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Inter-
mediate Monetary Target,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, November,
pp. 1169-1189.
[22] Rotemberg, Julio, and Michael Woodford, 1999, `Interest-Rate Rules in an
Estimated Sticky Price Model,' in Taylor (1999a).
[23] Sargent, Thomas J., 1999, The Conquest of American In°ation, Princeton
University Press.
[24] Taylor, John B., 1999, `An Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,' in
John B. Taylor (1999a).
[25] Taylor, John B., 1999a, Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press,
forthcoming.
19Figure 1
Response of Model to an Exogenous Monetary Policy Shock 
% dev from SS:  deviation from unshocked nonstochastic steady state growth path expressed in percent terms
APR:  annualized percentage rate
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Regions of Uniqueness, Explosiveness and Indeterminacy
Clarida-Gali-Gertler Rule
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Regions of Uniqueness, Explosiveness and Indeterminacy
Generalized Taylor Rule
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Regions of Uniqueness, Explosiveness and Indeterminacy
Lagged Taylor Rule
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Response to a Money Demand Shock Under Two Policy Rules 
Stable CGG Rule  
K% Rule   - - - - - - 
See Figure 1 for Notes
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19Figure 6
Response to a Money Demand Shock Under Unstable CGG Rule
Equilibrium 1
Equilibrium 2   - - - - - - -
See Figure 1 for Notes
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Response to a Negative Technology Shock Under Two Policy Rules
RW Lagged Response Rule
K% Rule   - - - - - - -
See Figure 1 for Notes
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19Figure 8
Response to a Negative Technology Shock Under Two Policy Rules
Perturbed RW Lagged Response Rule
K% Rule   - - - - - - -
See Figure 1 for Notes
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